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Abstract 
In order to improve the effectiveness of the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) response to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), the 
capabilities of the USMC will need to be matched to the demand created by future 
disasters. In this research, we study the USMC resources that are primarily 
responsible for the response, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). We study recent 
HADR events to determine how demands were met by the USMC. We identify the 
supplies by examining both assets and capabilities. We explore significant gaps, if 
any, that can be improved by the USMC MEU. 
Keywords: USMC, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
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Analyzing Resources of United States 
Marine Corps for Humanitarian Operations1 
Introduction 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) can rapidly respond to disasters 
due to high levels of readiness that are maintained on a constant basis. This 
research explores the resources of the USMC and how they may be employed to 
increase effectiveness and efficiency. Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, and Ingram (2013) 
studied the assets of the United States Navy (USN) and analyzed the USN disaster 
relief operations. By exploring USMC operations for similar instances, we analyze 
the historic data for deployment of the hard assets—equipment and associated 
personnel, and capabilities as soft assets. In the current economic environment, the 
realignment and restructuring of the forces and services, there is a need for research 
identifying specific naval resources and their utility to conduct humanitarian 
operations. 
As the United States (U.S.) military exits Afghanistan and prepares for a likely 
period of peacetime, non-combat operations provide a means for combatant 
commanders to engage in theater shaping. The USMC provides critical resources 
for these missions through their Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) that are flexible 
and adaptable to accomplish a wide range of operations, including non-combat 
missions. Given the recent frequency of disasters around the world, it is probable 
that the occurrence of these events will continue, thus creating a demand for the 
relief capabilities inherent to the MEUs that include deployable, flexible, and adept 
forces into austere environments while meeting urgent timelines (USMC, 2009).  
By seeking to reduce redundancy and focus on capabilities that are unique 
and/or provide an unfulfilled demand, the MEUs will provide more effective relief and 
reduce the effects of a disaster. Although the MEU response will undoubtedly 
provide aid and relief, it is critical that the USMC allocates its resources effectively to 
act at any given time.  
In this research, we explore the capabilities of the USMC, in particular the 
MEU, that satisfy the demand induced by disaster traits (Apte et al., 2013). We 
follow the framework discussed by Apte et al. (2013) and by Apte and Yoho (2012) 
for studying the USMC capabilities to match the supply with the demand from certain 
                                            
1 This research was conducted in conjunction and collaboration with Capt. Jared Gastrock and Capt. 
Juan Iturriaga, USMC. The MBA report associated with this article is “Analysis of United States 
Marine Corps Operations in Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief,” Capt. Jared R. 
Gastrock and Capt. Juan J. Iturriaga, U.S. Marine Corps, MBA Student Report, Advisors: Aruna Apte 
and Keenan Yoho. 
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past disasters. We compile and analyze data from multiple USMC publications, 
historical records of disasters, and the responses to those disasters. The resulting 
analysis sheds light on resources and capabilities of the USMC MEU capabilities to 
conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions. The 
different capabilities studied are information and knowledge management, needs 
assessment, supply, deployment and distribution, health service support, and 
collaboration and governance (Apte & Yoho, 2012) for the disasters selected. We 
have selected the 2007 cyclone on the southwest coast of Bangladesh, the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami for collection of the 
data. We selected these disasters because of their impact and the level of 
involvement of the USMC in relief operations. Figure 1 describes our research 
process model in terms of the overall process of our data collection and analysis.  
 
Figure 1. Research Process Model for Data Collection and Analysis 
Our present study makes a significant contribution to the academic literature 
in that it is the second organization being analyzed in terms of the capabilities for 
HADR. Based on previous studies, we identify specific USMC resources and 
capabilities with their utility for conducting disaster relief operations (Apte et al., 
2013). This research should stimulate further work to explore capabilities and 
competencies of other services and organizations in the private as well as public 
sector to be utilized in HADR. 
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe 
capabilities and resources needed for HADR operations. Following that, we discuss 
the supply from the USMC, and then the demand for relief requirements from the 
three disasters. The next section includes our observations about the response from 
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Capabilities and Resources 
Disasters initiate responses that have to satisfy a wide range of needs. 
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009), Apte (2009), and Kovács and Spens (2007) 
describe the activities that are critical to delivering relief to fulfill the demands of 
those affected. The activities, as shown in Figure 2, include information and 
knowledge management; needs assessment; supply, deployment and distribution; 
health service support; and collaboration and governance (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  
Collecting and organizing information and analyzing this collected information 
into knowledge have two advantages. The short-term benefit is that it leads to 
making appropriate plans to provide relief. The long-term value is that the knowledge 
retained helps in needs assessment across many disasters.  
Needs assessment is intelligence-gathering for military organizations. This is 
done through specific types of methods to develop an operational picture through 
requirement generation. Fusion of electronic data, human intelligence gathering, and 
imagery help the people involved understand what capabilities are needed to 
accomplish the specific mission. Needs assessment is critical for matching 
appropriate resources to the demand through capabilities of the available 
organizations. (Apte et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2. Essential Resources and Capabilities Studied for USMC (Apte & 
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Essential Resources and 
Capabilities for Disaster Response
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The USMC has certain pre-positioned supplies and determines usability and 
suitability before deploying any supply. The supply network facilitates the response 
by including procurement, storage, and maintenance of the USMC assets. Organic 
assets, as well as the capability for resupply, greatly influence the scope and 
duration of relief operations, ultimately determining the flexibility of response (Apte & 
Yoho, 2012). 
Transporting supplies to the end user is the overall goal of deployment and 
distribution for the USMC. This capability is referred to as lift, or the ability to 
transport personnel, goods, and equipment from staging areas to the disaster area 
and distribution locations (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Naval services utilize the ocean as a 
maneuver area to establish sea basing capability on ships and then employ sealift 
and airlift platforms to deliver aid to the end user, with rotary-wing airlift assets 
providing the most flexibility (Apte et al., 2013). 
Health services support is provided to prevent further loss of life and relieve 
pain and suffering because most disasters cause loss of life and casualties, as well 
as displaced persons. Large-scale medical operations involve naval hospital ships 
but are extremely cost intensive (Ures, 2011). Less costly but effective options 
include field hospitals and medical personnel imbedded with ground units to provide 
individual care. 
Collaboration and governance afford responders to coordinate efforts and 
increase efficiency. HADR operations most often include collaboration among 
military organizations, private sector, and non-government organizations (NGOs), as 
well as host nation governments. This is a difficult task even in normal 
circumstances. Given that all the organizations are operating in a chaotic and 
dynamic environment, without deliberate collaboration and coordination, relief efforts 
are unlikely to achieve the highest effectiveness possible (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
Furthermore, a well-defined command structure working with local governments, 
authorities, and community members facilitates the successful completion of 
missions planned. Figure 3 shows the relationship between military and non-military 
capabilities and how they fulfill the required capabilities in support of a disaster.  
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Figure 3. Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies 
Note. This figure was adapted from Joint Publication 4-0 (2008) 
and Apte & Yoho (2012). 
The Supply for Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief 
Response to any level of disaster must accomplish several capabilities to 
meet a wide range of demands for HADR relief. Apte et al. (2013) described the 
matching of USN capabilities to meet the demand brought on by the disaster traits of 
the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, thus executing the response supply chain. This supply chain of 
response is also a critical factor in determining overall capability for the lift (Apte & 
Yoho, 2012). Naval Services exploit their environment to establish distribution in 
supplying relief to the affected area with rotary-wing airlift in order to adapt to the 
dynamic nature of the supply chain (Apte & Yoho, 2012). A well-managed supply 
chain is a major enabler to response and extends further than just what the 
responder is equipped with (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  
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Suppliers of capabilities 
Certain capabilities of an organization that engages in HADR supply the 
necessary relief, in terms of products and services, to disaster-struck areas. The 
generation and dissemination of information is the first step in preparing an 
appropriate plan to provide relief in the wake of a disaster. This capability provides 
the responder with the critical information it needs to get the right support to the right 
place and the right people (Apte, 2009). Needs assessment seeks to determine what 
type of demand and how much of it exists so that appropriate aid can be delivered 
(Apte & Yoho, 2012).  
Virtually all disasters cause loss of life and casualties, as well as displaced 
persons. Accordingly, health services support must be provided to prevent further 
loss of life and relieve pain and suffering (Apte & Yoho, 2012; Apte et al., 2013). 
Finally, collaboration and governance provide responders with a means to 
coordinate efforts and increase efficiency. HADR operations are conducted normally 
in extreme conditions with participation from diverse organizations. Carefully 
planned collaboration and coordination is one of the primary paths to accomplish 
effectiveness and efficiency (Apte & Yoho, 2012). The resources for supply in the 
general context of HADR (previously shown in Figure 2) can be studied to 
understand the specific capabilities of the MEU.  
Marine Expeditionary Unit: the Supplier 
The MEU is a rapid-response force whose mission is to provide a forward-
deployed, flexible, sea-based Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capable of 
conducting amphibious operations, crisis response, and limited contingency 
operations. These enable the introduction of follow-on forces and designated special 
operations in order to support the theatre requirements of geographic combatant 
commanders (GCCs; USMC, 2009, p. 4). Such capabilities and resources 
encompass, indirectly, most of the broad spectrum of capabilities discussed earlier. 
Disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones, strike coastal areas with a higher 
frequency just due to the geography as shown by history. Because the USMC policy 
dictates that the MEU must possess five characteristics to ensure mission readiness, 
the significant one being that the MEU must accomplish a sea-based forward 
presence. In the past, earthquakes have occurred in countries (Indonesia, Haiti, 
Japan) in close proximity to the ocean. The earthquake-prone areas are located 
significantly near water. This creates a high risk of tsunami. Due to these 
circumstances, the MEU capable of amphibious operations is on par with the USN. 
Disaster, of any type (Apte, 2009), demands crisis response, and contingency 
operations. These specific demands tie into the capabilities of the MEU and make 
them one of the critical suppliers of HADR.  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 7 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
The USMC has a minimum of three MEUs deployed throughout the world. 
The 31st MEU is stationary in Okinawa, Japan. The other two are sourced from 
three MEUs on the east and west coast of the continental United States. The 22d, 
24th, and 26th MEUs are located in Camp Lejeune, NC; and the 11th, 13th, and 
15th MEUs are based out of Camp Pendleton, CA (USMC, 2009). 
Regardless of the geographic location of the mission, the MEU must be able 
to operate within the designated area of responsibility (AOR), independent of 
support from other nations. This is accomplished through the MEU’s use of naval 
platforms and a naval amphibious ready group (ARG) to provide mobile basing for 
global operations (USMC, 2009).  
The Demand from Disasters 
We now discuss three disasters in context of the response by the USMC. 
These disasters are selected because they offer diversity in terms of the type of 
disaster (such as sudden or slow-onset; Apte, 2009) and the condition of the 
affected host country (such as poverty, governance, development, etc.). Limitations 
on the availability of data and information were partially responsible for the choice.  
Cyclone, Bangladesh, 2007 
On November 15, 2007, the southwest coast of Bangladesh was ravaged by 
a tumultuous cyclone, which caused high winds and flooding. Figure 4 offers a 
glimpse into the devastation. 
 
Figure 4. 2007 Cyclone in Bangladesh  
As a result, over 3,200 people were killed, and an estimated 40,000 were 
injured (Command Element, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing [CE 3D MAW], 2008). The day 
after the cyclone struck, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) issued Tasking Order P-
137 that resulted in the assigning the Kearsage Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
and the 31st MEU (CE 3D MAW, 2008). Table 1 gives the overview of the 
devastation in Bangladesh. 
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 Overview of the Devastation in Bangladesh Table 1.
Earthquake, Haiti, 2010 
On January 2, 2010, an earthquake struck 14 miles away from the capital city 
of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, registering a 7.0 on the Richter scale. Figure 5 offers a 
glimpse into the devastation.  
 
Figure 5. 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
It is estimated that 230,000 people were killed and 197,000 injured 
(Command Element, II Marine Expeditionary Force [CE II MEF], 2010). After 
receiving verbal order from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), II MEF prepared 







1.6 million acres of 
farmland destroyed, 
350,000 head of livestock 
killed
Fresh water sources severly 
contaminated by salt water 
and debris
Loss of electricity and 
communication lines in 
affected districts
2.3 million households 
affected, including 1 
million seriously affected
8,000 km of roadways and 
2,000 km of waterways 
devastated
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ARGs, several other USN units, as well as African Partnership Station 10 (APS-10). 
Table 2 gives an overview of the devastation in Haiti. 
 
 Overview of the Devastation in Haiti Table 2.
Earthquake and Tsunami, Japan, 2011  
On March 11, 2011, mainland Japan suffered an earthquake that registered 
8.9 on the Richter scale and caused a tsunami, which struck the north Pacific coast 
of Japan and measured over 30 feet at its highest point (Command Element, 3d 
Marine Division [CE 3D MARDIV], 2011). Figure 6 shows a glimpse of the 
devastation. The disaster killed 14,898 people, injured 5,270 more, and left almost 
10,000 unaccounted for. On March 12, the commanding general of U.S. Forces 
Japan authorized III MEF, along with the 31st MEU, to deploy the first part of 
responders to the disaster area (Command Element, 3D Marine Expeditionary 








Destruction of all five medical 
facilities around Port-au-
Prince
Destruction of Toussaint 
L'Ouverture International 
Airport
Considerable damage to 
communication infrastructure
Major damage to roadways by 
debris
Major damages to the Port-au-
Prince seaport, rendering it 
unusable for immediate rescue 
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 Overview of the Devastation in Japan Table 3.
 
Figure 6. 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 
Discussion 
We now discuss the responses by the USMC and the unmet demand of the 
three disasters: the 2007 cyclone in Bangladesh, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 






Damage Meltdown of Fukushima nuclear power plant
Sendai Airport, Uranohama and 
Kesenumma-Oshima Seaports 
overwhelemed with debris
Widescale power outages and 
destruction of hard line 
communications
Majority of small structures, 
personal property and lines of 
transportation affected area 
destroyed
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Vignettes of the Response by the USMC 
Information and Knowledge Management 
Haiti received substantial humanitarian assistance from the USMC. MV-22 
Osprey aircrafts were used by the 24th MEU to survey the damage of the 
earthquake. After the notification of the disaster of the 2011 Japan earthquake, III 
MEF formed a crisis action team that started to gather information.  
Needs Assessment 
In response to the Bangladesh cyclone, a humanitarian assistance survey 
team (HAST), in conjunction with the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), assessed the situation on the ground and developed plans 
for execution by the consequent responders that were to follow.  
In Haiti, after the earthquake, the MEU completed assessment of affected 
areas and dispelled false reports of damage in northern Haiti. The 24th MEU also 
completed assessments of infrastructure in the northern area of Haiti and an 
assessment of relief distribution capabilities in the southern portion of the country 
(CE II MEF, 2010).  
After receiving the news of the Japan earthquake, the USMC started to plan 
the process and resource assessment in support of generating a response plan to 
the disaster (CE 3D MEB, 2011). The HASTs from the forward command element 
(FCE) assessed that the host nation response plan was well organized and that an 
effective strategy was in place. However, even with their years of training and 
preparation, Japanese responders were overwhelmed by the size of the disaster 
(CE 3D MEB, 2011). 
Supply 
In response to the Bangladesh cyclone, 3D Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) began providing water distribution. In addition, storage facilities were also 
provided.  
The USMC task force established sea-based operations in Haiti from which 
the Marines managed a hub-and-spoke–style distribution network of relief supplies, 
such as food and water. 
Standing up of the airport in Japan enabled the delivery of over 872 tons of 
supplies, including water, food, and hygiene kits (CE 3D MEB, 2011). As a 
continuation of infrastructure recovery, the FCE engaged and facilitated the delivery 
of critically needed fuel; clearing of debris from schools for use as shelters, as well 
as from the Kesenumma-Oshima seaport; clearing of debris from the Sendai-Tohoku 
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Shinkansen railroad station; and the restoration of power to the Oshima Islands (CE 
3D MEB, 2011). 
Deployment and Distribution 
In response to the Bangladesh cyclone, 3D MEB provided overall support for 
distribution and lift. The USMC proposed establishing a secondary logistics 
distribution center along the southeast coast of Bangladesh to provide further 
support. Upon denial by the government of Bangladesh, only one primary 
debarkation point was utilized during the relief operation (CE 3D MAW, 2008). 
The strategy of distribution of Joint Task Force–Haiti (JTF-H) was to use the 
MEUs’ rotary-wing assets to distribute food and water supplies using a hub-and-
spoke distribution model while providing a steady state of supply (CE II MEF, 2010).  
In Japan, the FCE provided assistance by creating Task Force Fuji, which 
consisted of a logistically focused group sourced from Combat Logistics Regiment 
35 from Marine Corps Base, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan, among other 
contributors (CE 3D MEB, 2011). The task force assumed the heavy lift and 
equipment requirements of the airport recovery, allowing the 320th Squadron 
members to focus on other vital reconstruction areas. This facilitated the rapid 
completion of the project, and the airport was reopened in a matter of days. 
Health Service Support 
In response to the Bangladesh cyclone, 3D MEB began delivering preventive 
and primary medical care.  
Collaboration and Governance 
After providing the humanitarian aid in Haiti, the goal of U.S. involvement was 
to prevent the loss of life, then facilitate the existing charities’ efforts to rebuild the 
affected area (CE II MEF, 2010). During the initial phase, JTF-H was established 
with a command and control capability that provided liaison opportunity between the 
U.S. military, diplomatic leadership, the USAID, and the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti. This command and control organization also established a 
humanitarian aid coordination center to manage the relief efforts of the government 
of Haiti, the USAID, the United Nations, and NGOs providing relief to the disaster 
(CE II MEF, 2010). 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the response provided by the USMC through 
each capability and resource.  
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 Bangladesh cyclone response by USMC Table 4.
Demand met by USMC
Unclassified and plain text 
communications
Public affairs liasons
Needs assessment Initial HAST
Supply Potable water
HAST coordination
Establishment of joint 
HLZs
Inclusion of host nation 
and NGOs in planning 
process
Delivery of water purifiers 
and supplies from USAID 
via rotary wing aircraft and 
LCACs
Collaboration and governance
Information and knowledge management
Deployment and distribution
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 Haiti Earthquake Response by USMC Table 5.
Demand met by USMC
Troop contact and info 
gathering with victims   




Fuel, drinking water, food, 
medical supplies
Manpower for sea and air 
port security
Basic aid to remote 
populations
Civil affairs officer as 
liaison 
Collaboration with      JTF-
H, NGOs and USAID 
Deployment and distribution








Information and knowledge management
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 Japan earthquake and tsunami response by USMC Table 6.
The Unmet Demand 
We now list the relief that was not provided. We do not delve into the reasons. 
However, we summarize the unmet demand for each disaster based on the 
capabilities and resources. Tables 7, 8, and 9 summarize the unmet demand at each 
of the disasters discussed.  
Demand met by USMC
Social media
Unclassified and plain text 
communication 
Rotary wing imagery 
Creation of crisis action 
planning team
Initial HAST
Rotary wing aerial surveys
Manpower and equipment 
for debris clearance 
Fuel 
Helicopter lift of supplies 
and personnel  to JSDF
Trucks
Exchange of embedded 
liaison teams with JSDFCollaboration and governance
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during initial releif 
Tactical 
distribution sites 






Interpreters   




















Information and Knowledge Management
Deployment and Distribution
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Security of distribution routes and points
Civil order/governance 
Safety at refugee camps
Debris clearance
Trucks, ambulances, heavy equipment   
Dissemination of releif facilities
Distribution lift capabilities 
Landing capacity for fixed wing aircraft
Latrines and sanitation facilties
Mortuary services    
Medical supplies and personnel
Functioning government
Personnel at NGO's coordination cell
Large scale response collaboration





Information and knowledge management
Deployment and distribution
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 Unmet demand for Japan earthquake and tsunami Table 9.
Conclusion 
Through an analysis of responses provided by the MEU and an assessment 
of the remaining unmet demands following each disaster, we determined which 
capabilities and resources the MEU could have provided to fulfill those unmet 
demands. These are given in Table 10.  
Unmet Demand
Validated and accurate information
Accurate, timely and understandable 
radiation reports
Accurate radiation measurments
Manpower and equipment for search 
and rescue and debris clearance
Restoration of electricity 
Initial, food, water, clothing, shelter
Radiological detection
Civil order
Health service support Care for children, elderly, sick and poor
Large scale coordination of government 
and NGOs 
Timely acceptance of aid  -Unity of 
effort between Japanese Govt, TEPCO 
and foreign aid.
TrucksDeployment and distribution
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 MEU capabilities for unmet demands across the disasters Table 10.
The unmet demands from the three disasters that we studied suggested 
potential capabilities MEU can employ to accomplish better HADR. Information and 
knowledge management capabilities fell short due to the absence of ability to 
communicate to masses. This was extenuated by inadequate technology, such as 
mobile devices and fidelity of information. Both could have been mitigated by the 
MEU’s S2 intelligence section and S6 communication section. In addition, MEU’s 
MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53, and UH-1 helicopter could have distributed mass 
notification. 
Needs assessment was inadequate due to incomplete data from remote and 
isolated areas. This could have benefited from an infantry battalion of MEU, which 
has capabilities of reaching, geographically and figuratively, such areas. Inaccurate 
detection of radiation levels at the Fukushima Power Plant need not have been an 
issue because the MEU’s Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) section 
could have been of help, at least in certain areas.  
Distribution of critical supplies can be done without looting, violence, or unrest 
because the USMC’s manpower resources offer many solutions. Specifically, the 
MEU capabilitties to satisfy unmet demand
S2 Intelligence section
S6 Communications section







Infantry Battalion of Marines
(2) Tactical water purifiers
Infantry Battalion of Marines
Military Police Detachment  
(4) Forklifts, (1) Bulldozer, (1) Excavator  
(31) MTVR Trucks, (105) HMMWV, (15) AAV
(19) Rotary wing aircraft, (2) C-130 
(31) MTVR Trucks, (105) HMMWV, (15) AAV, 
(4) Forklifts
Health service support Embedded Navy corpsmen
Civil affairs section 
Public affairs section 
Collaboration and governance
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military police platoons are proficient in restoring order and providing security. In 
addition, the sheer presence of Marines is likely to have influence in preventing 
crime against the most vulnerable people, such as children, the elderly, and the sick. 
As per capability to supply, the MEU’s two tactical water purifiers can alleviate 
water shortage until other relief organizations arrive. Though the relief supply 
distribution offers many challenges, ground transportation is a substantial capability 
of the MEU due to its hard assets, such as 31 seven-ton trucks, 105 HMMWVs, and 
15 AAVs. For the loading and unloading of the cargo, the four forklifts also are 
significantly useful. It should be noted that the absence of forklifts was a major 
deterrent in relief distribution during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Banda Ache 
(Apte, 2009). The MEU’s 19 rotary-wing aircrafts, an unparalleled resource, can help 
delivering the supplies to area inaccessible by land transportation. Such last-mile 
distribution will be a great enabler for smaller NGOs in the future HADR operations. 
We also conclude, based on our observations, that there was an overall 
deficiency in medical support. In the future, it could be partially removed by 
embedded Navy Corpsman with Marine ground troops. Last, but definitely not the 
least, the MEU’s civil affairs and public affairs sections can improve collaboration 
and coordination. Such effort will allow the MEU to better match the capabilities and 
resources with the demands of the victims in the affected areas.  
After evaluating the overall response to the three disasters, we concluded that 
the MEU’s information assets, including aerial, human, and ground intelligence, are 
effective at developing an operational picture of the environment immediately 
following a disaster. When shared and validated via a non-classified network, this 
information can increase the situational awareness of all stakeholders and improve 
overall response. MEU aerial assets, especially rotary wing aircraft, as well as 
ground troops, have proven effective at determining demand for relief. Although 
using push logistics on a macro scale, the MEU can use these assessments to tailor 
their actions to respond to the pull of demand on the ground. The supply of critical 
goods such as food and drinking water are always in high demand with the onset of 
the disaster. The MEU can meet these immediate needs, but, furthermore, the 
Marines are capable of establishing security and stability, conducting search and 
rescue operations, debris clearance, and basic medical care.  
Like most military organizations, the MEU excels at deployment and 
distribution through the use of amphibious and especially rotary wing assets and 
manpower. This provides the ability to lift and distribute assets within an austere 
environment when other organizations cannot. Accordingly, the MEU presents 
tremendous potential to multiplying the effectiveness of other responders. While 
conducting HADR operations, the MEU provides health services in the form of 
embedded Navy medical personnel, casualty evacuation, as well as chemical, 
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biological, radiological and nuclear disaster response. Notably, an embedded Navy 
corpsman is able to treat injuries in remote and isolated areas that are not covered 
by most responders. Finally, the clearly defined command structure of the MEU can 
successfully liaise with the host nations and other organizations to enhance overall 
relief operations by promoting collaboration and governance through communication 
and information dissemination. 
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